whether or not there is a goldfinch in the garden, and the skeptical impulse to go and puncture it, with the question of whether or not a singer is in tune:
I have no idea whether this bit of academic sadism would be making sure it's real "in the same way" as I might have made sure it's a goldfinch (unless someone wishes to insist that this is making sure it is a goldfinch, while another might wish to insist that only God could really do that (as only a composer can make sure that the tonic is well established (though who is it who makes sure that the singing is on pitch, the singer or the sung to?). 10 In this wonderful sequence of parentheses within parentheses, the question of whether an other (I or God) can know that the goldfinch exists (or perhaps even that the goldfinch is in pain) is presented as similar or identical in philosophical force and significance as the question of whether the singer knows her own pitch better than the listener wincing at its flatness or sharpness (if this were the case there would be no more singing out of tune, I suppose; ears can lie). A couple of pages later the auricular motif returns not to illustrate but to allegorize skepticism. Again a phanto-Here we find the problem of skepticism distilled clearly and devastatingly, like poison to be poured into ears.
The institution of philosophy, as it is traditionally understood, is perhaps uncertain what to do with these passages. The prose may seem a touch too purple, the voice too idiosyncratic, the examples too elliptic to be pertinent to philosophical investigation. The explanation suggesting itself immediately, namely that the aural tint of these passages is a rhetorical gesture or an ephemeral residue of the musical life that preceded his philosophical career, seems within reason. It is also reasonable to remind ourselves that for a writer for whom style has always been an intrinsic part of philosophical investigation, there is no such thing as philosophically unimportant stylistic or figurative choices. The persistence of these aural tropes and of a fascination with the ear as an organ throughout Cavell's oeuvre -his autobiographical work, his philosophical essays, as well as his literary criticism -alone should be enough to convince us. Thus we cannot help but notice that in his meditation on the ethical demands of theater, the audience's skeptical tendency to treat Othello's behavior merely as acting is understood in terms of an acoustic interference: "an excuse, whistling in the dark." 12 We are similarly struck by a memory, related in Little Did I Know, of hearing "a faint low hum as if produced by the ground" nobody else could hear and its Cavell's projection of the skeptical impulse -our restless inability to acknowledge our separateness and our denial to acknowledge others -to the ear culminates in his definition of skepticism as "the denial of the need to listen" and as "the refusal of the ear." 14 The skeptical problem has been transposed, and is here presented as both a distortion of our auditory sense and a denial of the way we ordinarily listen. Skepticism is thus not only made out as a confusion of the soul, but as a confusion of our ears. As these passages suggest, Cavell's penchant for aural, musical or auricular themes is not an indulgence, but communicates on a deeper level with a set of questions -skepticism, separateness, and acknowledgmentthat are at the heart of his philosophy. The answer as to why skepticism is here transposed to the ear will also provide an insight into why, for Cavell, autobiography is philosophically significant. In Cavell's writing, the role of autobiography, and in particular the stories surrounding his scarred tympanum, belie the idea of autobiography as a minor, solely auxiliary, genre to his principal philosophical preoccupation. The story of Cavell's scarred tympanum is not ancillary but essential to his philosophy. Prosaically speaking, without the accident Cavell may have not become a philosopher. Both A Pitch of Philosophy and Little Did I Know in fact relate the story of how his scarred tympanum twice thwarted his intentions to join the war effort, first in 1943 and then a year later in 1944, thus propelling him initially towards a life of music and then to one of philosophy. 15 However, Cavell's scarred tympanum not only merits our attention because, closing some of life's doors and opening others, it set him on the path of philosophy. It should command our attention because "a philosopher's or writer's autobiography [...] tells the writer's story of the life out of which he came to be a (his kind of) writer." 16 Put differently, Cavell's autobiographical writings, and in particular the story of his scarred tympanum, tell not only of the how but also of the why of his phi- Adelman argues that from Hamlet onward a certain view of female, and in particular maternal, sexuality and tragedy are concomitant. In these plays maternal sexuality is perceived as "the initial premise of tragedy, the fall that brings death into the world." 25 The fantasy by which Shakespeare's tragic heroes project anxieties about mortality and subjectivity onto women's bodies is, according to Adelman, rooted in early modern conceptions of pregnancy and nursing where the mother was thought to hold tyrannous sway over the child's life and death. Associations between womb and tomb were strong in the period. Women were not only believed to be able to suffocate their child in their womb if they so wished, but birth itself was understood "as the fetus's response to the inadequate supply of air or food in the womb." 26 According to this view the mother's body is, for the child, a source of both pleasure and peril: longed for and feared in equal measure. Cavell's image of Hamlet as "resisting birth, holding back from existence," or wishing to "remai[n] in his mother's womb, as if always buried alive, or caught in the passage out" echoes Adelman's account. 27 Just as Suffocating Mothers resonates throughout Cavell's reading of Shakespeare, Adelman's work is deeply indebted to his interpretation of the skeptical problem. In Adelman's work, the selfhood that Hamlet constructs in response to the perceived maternal threat, for example, bears a striking resemblance to Cavell's definition of skepticism. 28 Like the skeptic, Hamlet withdraws from the world, retreating "into what he imagines as an inviolable core of selfhood that cannot be played 26. Ibid., 6. After birth the mother's life-giving and life-taking abilities were not thought to grow any weaker; mother's milk was deemed unsafe for consumption for up to a month after birth. Even though wet-nurses, to whom children were routinely sent, often had "contaminated or insufficient milk," malnutrition meant the nursing period often lasted for up to two or three years (4). After experiencing "a prolonged period of infantile dependency, during which they were subject to pleasures and dangers especially associated with nursing and the maternal body," children would then be subjected to a sudden weaning process "routinely by the application of wormwood or another bittertasting substance to the nipple -and abrupt separation from the nurse -mother he or she might have known for two or more years" (5). This prolonged dependency and traumatic separation, Adelman suggests in her book, would have had devastating consequences for the infant's sense of self and attachment. Adelman's work on early-modern conceptions of nursing are thus also felt in Cavell's reading of the scene in The Winter's Tale, in which Mamillius' whisperings into Hermione's ear are seen as precipitating Leontes' skeptical spiral. Cavell suggests that Leontes' skepticism is stirred by his envy of the intimate relations between, on the one hand, Hermione and her unborn child and, on the other, Hermione and Mamillius, whose name is reminiscent of a nursing infant. See Cavell, Disowning, 196 . This reading opens yet another set of intriguing parallels between Cavell's and Winnicott's works, particularly his ideas relating to "the nursing couple." 27. Cavell, Disowning, 14. 28. Cavell is in fact one of the "four dear friends" or "gracious presences" that were in Adelman's "head throughout the writing of [Suffocating Mothers]." See Adelman, Suffocating, x. The accidental meeting of akin minds and the ensuing catalysis of ideas is perhaps another instance of life's sway over philosophy. erencing contemporary psychoanalytic theories of early child development. 33 In this sense, the connection between skepticism and the mother's body also rests upon "the insights of Winnicott," for whom the individual's ability to "hope that there is a live relationship between inner reality and external reality, between innate primary creativity and the world at large"; 34 in other words, the individual's ability to resist the skeptical impulse is here envisioned as depending on whether their mother is able to respond to them appropriately during the months of infancy. 35 Adelman is neither merely drawing on Cavellian conceptions of skepticism, nor simply offering a psychoanalytic interpretation of Shakespearean tragedy. By interweaving early modern notions of and psychoanalytical insights into the motherinfant relationship her work seems to imply that the tragic hero's fantasies of maternal origin are rooted in a psychoanalytic actuality and are thus also relevant for Cavell's thinking about skepticism. In doing so, she crucially highlights where Winnicott's notion of the detrimental effects of a prolonged misattunement between mother and infant are compatible with what fuels the skeptic's hamartia, that is, his compulsion to "interpret a metaphysical finitude as an intellectual lack." 36 When Adelman ent sexual being whose life of desire survives the birth of a son and the death of a husband, a life that may present itself to her son as having been abandoned by her"
and the "acceptance of one's father as a dependent sexual being [...] which may present itself to his son as having to abandon him" -does not hinge on the child's desire for the mother's body, but rather on his loss of union with her body. 42 At stake is his desire to affirm individuality and subjectivity as distinct from his mother. 43 The crux of the dumb-show as primal scene is Hamlet's, is the skeptic's, anxiety about who he is. At its heart is thus, in Cavell's words, "the origin of the individual" and the question of "how he or anyone lets himself be born as the one he is." 44 The skeptic's anxieties, albeit projected onto the maternal body, are, as is so pithily put elsewhere, about himself: "I am the philosophical problem. I am." 45 Towards the end of the Hamlet essay, the ear-detail in the dumb-show is in fact no longer primarily understood to symbolize the sexual act. Instead, Cavell focuses on the abstract content of the primal scene. He notes that for Freud the primal scene, or "phylogenetic inheritance," is transmitted from parent to child by way of the ear: "the family sounds or sayings, the spoken or secret discourses, going on prior to the subject's arrival, within which he must take his way." 46 Cavell continues: "I hope you will be struck by the fit of this account with the fact that Hamlet's fantasy of the dumb-show takes up something he heard from his ancestor's ghost and that features the mortal vulnerability of the ear." 47 The mortal vulnerability of the ear here speaks to a precarious sense of self, to the self's inability to conceive of itself as separate, distinct and mortal.
Just as Cavell hoped we would hear the resonances between Freud's understanding of the auricular mechanism of phylogenetic inheritance and the function of the ear in the dumb-show, I hope that you "will be struck by the fit" of Cavell's account of the "mortal vulnerability of the ear" in Hamlet, his transposition of skepticism to the ear in, amongst other places, The Claim of Reason and the stories of his scarred tympanum. Before the invention of sulpha drugs, the treatment of said damaged ear consisted of the use of "heavy tweezers with elongated jaws to clamp upon increasing sizes of hard rubber tubes, or tight rolls of cotton, and force them into
becoming, so to speak, effigies of skepticism in Disowning Knowledge, have a bearing on Cavell's figurative choice. The skeptical condition is however not gender-specific, but affects us in as much as we are human. The maternal origin is, in this sense, merely emblematic of our birth into the human condition; women are as much prone to skepticism as men are. In Little Did I Know and A Pitch of Philosophy Cavell also dwells on his complex relationship with his father. These narratives, just like the stories about his mother, do not describe gender-specific complexities, say of father-son, or motherson dynamics, but our common human experience of separateness. For a compelling reading of Cavell's assertion in Little Did I Know that "We see our fathers naked, we men" see Yi-Ping Ong, "Of Voice [the] ear canal." 48 Pain, the incommunicability of our own pain and the inaccessibility of the pain of others, is a central motif in philosophy's wrestling with skepticism. It is therefore perhaps not surprising that, looking back on his life, Cavell's links the first stirrings of the his skeptical impulse to the excruciating treatments of his ear:
[T]he primitiveness and painfulness of the early medical treatments of my ear [...] determined a general attempt to learn a distance from my body and so attempts to undo that learning, and which will mould the common male doubt, at certain stages, that one specifically will bear up under torture. 49 The ear's "mortal vulnerability" registers the skeptical impulse -to distance oneself from one's body and hence one's humanity -literally as well as figuratively. The scarred tympanum literally initiates the child to the human skeptical condition because it marks the child's first conscious experience of pain and thus the first recognition that it is separate from its mother. 50 Just as in Hamlet's fabulated account of the ear-poisoning, it stands for the issue of inheritance, that is, for how we assert our subjectivity as our own and as distinct from our parents'. In Little Did I Know and A Pitch of Philosophy, the struggle for individuation is registered not merely in the account of Cavell's scarred tympanum but also in the related narrative strand of perfect pitch: his recognition that unlike his mother he did not possess this magical faculty and his subsequent decision to trade musical for philosophical vocation.
Perfect Pitch
Cavell suggests that "the story of [his] ear as an organ of my body" inflects "certain questions of ear that run through [his] life," questions also including "the realities
49. Cavell, Pitch, 30. 50. As philosopher and psychoanalyst Marcia Cavell notes, the realisation that we can hide our pain or that "even when it is not hidden others may be indifferent to it, and that even when they care, they cannot remove pain from the child as they can a scratchy sweater" is part of the child's cognitive and emotional development: his beginning to understand himself as separate from his mother, in short as a subject. See In order to begin to fathom how the story of his scarred tympanum colors the story of his perfect philosophical pitch we must turn once again to the account of his car accident. The car accident that left Cavell with a damaged left ear happened close to the house on Atlanta Avenue he shared with his parents, his maternal grandmother and his mother's brothers. Although the accident happened when they were still living in the house on Atlanta Avenue, Cavell notes that he only became aware of the gravity of the damage to his left ear "after we moved to the north side." 54 The move away from the first family home he had ever known would prove no less dramatic than the accident and its consequences. In the autobiography the two traumatic events are in fact merged. Cavell speaks of this "move on turning seven years old" as a move away "from a house of continuous interest and talk and music to a set of moves and apartments in which [he] was largely abandoned to silence and to occasional strangers." 55 The move thus meant a removal from his mother's musical and gregarious family to a life where he was either left alone or left alone with his parents' difficult relationship. The account of his life spanning from this move to his leaving for college is pervaded by a deep sense of gratitude towards his parents, as well as by an acute experience of separateness. This feeling is mainly understood as a function of his par- Cavell's mother, Fannie Segal, was an "extraordinary" musician and vignettes proclaiming her talent and the pleasure she took in music are present throughout the autobiographical work. 59 Her talent was, Cavell writes, "natural" and "attested in the assured fire with which she played, for example, the Liszt Sixth and Thirteenth Hungarian Rhapsodies, the closing pages of Chopin First and Fourth Ballades, or the Shultz-Elver arrangement of the 'Blue Danube'." 60 What secured Fannie Segal's name as the best and most sought-after piano player in Atlanta more than anything else was "her uncanny ability to sightread." 61 Akin to this talent, was her "capacity to put aside any interference, as of her own will, and to let the body be moved, unmechanically, by the mind of those racing notes." 62 In A Pitch of Philosophy this "lapse of distance -say that she was the music then and there; there was nothing beyond her to read into" is captured "by an image of a certain mood that caused her to play the piano for herself" in a "room darkened below the level at
57. Ibid., 21. 58. Joan Richardson, whose reading of the philosophical significance of Cavell's autobiographical accounts of perfect pitch runs in many ways parallel to mine, also points to the link between Cavell's struggle for individuation and his choice to seek a vocation that was not his mother's. Although we both argue for the importance of psychoanalysis for Cavell ' Perfect, or absolute, pitch is the ability to recognize the pitch of a note or produce any given note. The fact that Cavell's mother and one of her brothers possessed this ability, whilst he did not, was "a source of anguished perplexity," because it also meant that their vocation -a life of music, was not to be his. 68 Indeed, his lack of was meant to do that required an equivalent of the enigmatic faculty of perfect pitch." 70 Just as for Hamlet, the issue for Cavell was "not to prove that this further life was better than another, but to prove that it was mine, that I was born to it, that I was 82 Like all of our words, the words with which we describe our lives, discover our forms of life and for Cavell an intrinsic part of our forms life is our common separateness. Far from being navelgazing, the autobiographical narrative of his scarred tympanum seeks to speak to the existential human predicament of separateness. Cavell chooses philosophy over psychoanalysis, because what concerns him is not merely his own soul or his trauma, but the trauma of being human and of being thus separate. In his autobiography he therefore tries to grapple not only with his wounds, but with wounds common to all He also chooses philosophy over psychoanalysis because he believes, together with Wittgenstein, that only philosophy can provide an efficacious therapy for our condition.
The story of the scarred tympanum and related auricular narrative or thematic strands register not autobiography but "an abstraction of autobiography." 83 
